

Challenges of Environmental Governance in Afghanistan Under Taliban 2.0

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Afghanistan, a nation known for its rich natural landscapes and diverse ecosystems, has long struggled with environmental governance challenges, an issue that has remained critical yet often overlooked. Following the fall of the Taliban 1.0 regime in late 2001, significant efforts were made to establish and strengthen environmental governance frameworks, including the creation of the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), the approval of environmental laws, and the formulation of numerous regulations and policies. However, these initiatives largely failed to achieve their intended goals, leading to an exacerbation of environmental problems that resulted in casualties and damages surpassing those caused by the country's ongoing conflicts. With the rise of Taliban 2.0 in 2021, the governance landscape in Afghanistan has undergone a profound change, particularly in the realm of environment. Under the Taliban 2.0 regime, existing environmental protection frameworks have been severely undermined, further diminishing the effectiveness of environmental governance and intensifying the environmental challenges the country faces. This study adopts the environmental view of governance to provide a comprehensive analysis of the current state of environmental governance under the Taliban 2.0. Utilising a combination of primary and secondary sources, including expert opinions, government and international organisation reports, and existing literature, the study identifies and examines the major challenges confronting environmental governance in Afghanistan today.

Keywords: Environmental Governance, Natural Resources, Pollution, Taliban, Afghanistan

Afghanistan, a country with rich natural landscapes and diverse ecosystems, has faced numerous challenges in the past few decades. Among these, environmental governance stands out as one of the most critical yet often neglected issues. This neglect has led to severe consequences, including increased pollution, loss of biodiversity, and degradation of natural resources, which have contributed to health problems, reduced quality of life, and economic losses (Saba, 2001; UNEP, 2006). Therefore, effective governance of the environment is as vital as halting the ongoing conflicts and achieving peace in Afghanistan. Effective environmental management can simultaneously reduce human casualties and financial losses caused by environmental degradation and steer the country toward sustainable development.

During the rule of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), significant strides were made in establishing frameworks and institutions dedicated to environmental

protection. In 2005, the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) was created to develop, coordinate, and implement national environmental policies, regulations, and programs aimed at protecting and preserving the country's natural resources, promoting sustainable development, and ensuring environmental quality for the health and well-being of its citizens. (NEPA, n.d.-b). Alongside NEPA, numerous national and international organisations became involved in environmental protection. Despite these efforts, the increasing environmental issues inflicted more losses and casualties on the country than the war and insecurity at that time (Flores, 2019). The Increasing air pollution, loss of biological diversity, deforestation, illegal hunting, and unsustainable use of the country's natural resources contributed to an environmental crisis that required urgent attention.

The fall of the IROA and the rise of Taliban 2.0¹ to power in August 2021 marked a profound shift in the governance system. The democratic governance structure was replaced by a religious autocracy, which left less scope for the participation of citizens in decision-making processes ("Theocracy Taliban Zeed Ejmaa Milli Ast," 2022). Other elements of governance, such as accountability, transparency, the rule of law, and regulatory quality, were severely declined. Consequently, all public apparatus face significant challenges in fulfilling their mandates.

NEPA, a government body responsible for environmental protection and conservation, is facing a significant decline in its capacity to fulfil its mandate. Its social and political support has sharply decreased, along with its administrative capacity and financial resources. International partners like UNEP, UNDP, USAID, and the World Bank have suspended financial and technical support, causing many projects initiated during the republic to halt (NEPA, 2022). Consequently, NEPA has lost its standing on regional and international platforms, worsening the country's ecological problems. Currently, environmental challenges in Afghanistan are escalating. Pollution claims thousands of lives annually, deforestation is widespread, natural resources are being depleted without proper environmental assessments, and wildlife is hunted and trafficked at alarming rates. The lack of robust governance mechanisms to address these issues has further complicated the environmental landscape (Hussaini, 2023).

Taking an environmental view of governance, this study employs descriptive-analytical and historical methods to provide an overview of environmental governance under Taliban 2.0. It utilises both primary and secondary sources—including interviews with 15 Afghan experts and practitioners in environmental governance, governmental documents, reports from international organisations, and extant scholarly literature—the research aims to identify and analyse the challenges posed by Taliban 2.0's environmental policies. Through this approach, the study endeavours to elucidate the critical crisis confronting Afghanistan's natural resources, offering an in-depth understanding of the issues at hand.

¹ The terms "Taliban 1.0" and "Taliban 2.0" though not conceptualised universally, are occasionally employed in political discourses to differentiate between the two distinct periods of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. "Taliban 1.0" refers to the first Taliban regime (1996-2001), while "Taliban 2.0" denotes the current regime that assumed control of Afghanistan following the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021. This research also utilises these designations to clearly distinguish between the two phases of Taliban rule.

The study is organized into five sections. The following section provides a brief overview of the concept of environmental governance. The third section examines environmental governance in Afghanistan from a historical perspective, exploring how past policies have shaped the environmental landscape under different regimes. The fourth section describes the state of governance in the environmental sector during the IROA, referencing the institutional, legal, and policy frameworks established during that time. The fifth section analyses the current state of the environmental governance under the Taliban 2.0 government, including recent policy changes, the operational status of NEPA, and the impact of Taliban 2.0 policies on the country's environmental health. This section adopts an analytical perspective to explain why the Taliban 2.0 government is crisis-prone despite its opportunities and potential, exploring the socio-political dynamics, resource constraints, and international isolation that contribute to governance challenges.

The Concept of Environmental Governance

Global awareness of environmental protection increased in the 1970s, driven by growing environmental threats that prompted a collective international response. This heightened awareness was further amplified by significant global initiatives, including the establishment of the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 (Brundtland Commission), the Earth Summit in 1992 (Rio Declaration), the Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 (Johannesburg Declaration), and a series of subsequent global movements (Razzaque, 2013). These efforts contributed to the establishment of mechanisms for more effective environmental management. Since then, environmental governance has been the subject of ongoing debates within academic and policy-making circles. To gain a deeper understanding of this concept, it is essential to first examine the notion of governance itself.

Governance, in conventional terms, is used as a synonym for government to describe the exercise of authority in the management of resources to promote national development (Ogunkan, 2022). However, the concept of governance has undergone significant evolution over time, with new dimensions being introduced. Today, governance extends beyond government institutions to include various key actors, such as informal structures. The concept is applied across multiple fields, including political science, international relations, public administration, management, and economics, covering a wide range of sectors (Pierre & Peters, 2000). Key domains of governance—such as political governance, economic governance, administrative governance, digital governance, corporate governance, and environmental governance—each focus on a specific area, addressing unique aspects of governance. Despite its widespread use, the concept of governance remains highly contested (Schneider, 2004). Researchers, experts, and practitioners have presented different views on the field. Bevir (2012) writes that governance refers to changes in public organisations since the 1980s, while Fukuyama (2013) defines it as the government's ability to create and enforce laws and provide services, regardless of whether the government is democratic or not. Rhodes (2012) conceptualises governance as the concept that “signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to new processes of governing; or changed conditions of ordered rule; or new methods by which society is governed.” (Rhodes, 2012). In a separate work, he writes that there are at least seven uses of governance: - as minimal government - as corporate

governance - as new public management - as good governance - as international interdependence - as a socio-cybernetic system – and as network (Rhodes, 2000).

Besides scholars, various international organisations and institutions have proposed different approaches to governance. The World Bank (1992) describes governance as “the way of exercising power in managing the economic and social resources of a country for development,” while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines it as “the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs” (UNDP, 1997). The above discussion suggests that governance carries various meanings. However, in this research, governance is defined specifically in terms of good governance, as outlined by R. A. W. Rhodes. UNDP (1997) stated that “good governance is characterised as participatory, transparent, accountable, effective, equitable, and promoting the rule of law. The concept is defined by Scobie (2018) as the quality of the governance processes within institutions and among actors in a given sector and includes values such as transparency, participation, equity, effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability.

Environmental governance, a distinct branch within the broader domain of governance, focuses on the sustainable management and stewardship of natural resources and ecosystems. As with governance in general, environmental governance is subject to varied definitions and interpretations. Haque (2020) characterises it as encompassing “laws, practices, policies, and institutions that shape how humans interact with the environment.” Similarly, Lemos and Agrawal (2006) describe environmental governance as “a set of regulatory processes, mechanisms, and organisations through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes.” This concept is fundamentally concerned with enhancing natural resource quality, addressing environmental degradation, and safeguarding ecosystems to benefit both current and future generations (Razzaque, 2013). Thus, effective environmental governance necessitates collaboration across multiple levels of government and engagement from both public and private sector stakeholders, as well as partnerships between the state and civil society (Speth & Haas, 2006). Environmental governance manifests in various forms, including international treaties, national legislation and regulations, local decision-making structures, transnational organisations, and environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOS) (John, 2004). It is guided by principles such as transparency, accountability, participation, and effectiveness (Durant et al., 2004; UNDP, n.d.).

Environmental governance encompasses three key dimensions: legal, policy, and institutional frameworks (Ogunkan, 2022). The legal framework includes laws, regulations, and international agreements that establish the rules for environmental protection and resource management. These laws set standards for pollution control, conservation, and sustainable use of natural resources. The policy framework involves strategies, plans, and policies designed to implement and achieve environmental objectives. Policies guide actions at various levels, ensuring that environmental considerations are integrated into development planning and decision-making processes. The institutional framework refers to the organisations, agencies, and structures responsible for enforcing laws, implementing policies, and managing environmental programs. Effective institutional frameworks promote coordination, capacity building, and stakeholder engagement, ensuring that environmental governance is comprehensive and inclusive. It should be noted that

the three holistic frameworks are interconnected and mutually dependent. Successful policy formulation and implementation require a conducive institutional environment. Legislation establishes the necessary regulatory and fiscal tools, providing human and technical resources for environmental policy. It is crucial for governance, planning, protection, and pollution control.

Similar to the diverse interpretations of environmental governance, the application of this concept also varies significantly across different contexts. Environmental governance in developed and developing countries showcases substantial differences in approach, capacity, and outcomes influenced by economic, social, and political factors. In developed countries, environmental governance is typically proactive, underpinned by comprehensive legal frameworks, robust institutions, and high levels of public awareness and participation. Nations such as Germany, Japan and the United States have stringent environmental regulations addressing air and water quality, waste management, and climate change mitigation. These regulations are enforced by well-funded agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States² and the Federal Environment Agency in Germany³. Public involvement in environmental decision-making is a prominent feature, with citizens and non-governmental organisations actively participating in advocacy and conservation efforts. Technological innovations and substantial investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable infrastructure further bolster environmental governance in these countries. Additionally, developed nations often spearhead international environmental initiatives and provide financial and technical assistance to support global sustainability efforts (United Nations Climate Change, 2021).

In contrast, environmental governance in developing countries is often reactive, constrained by economic limitations, institutional weaknesses, and significant socio-economic challenges. Countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America frequently face the dilemma of prioritising immediate economic development over long-term environmental sustainability (Minneti, 2018). Limited financial resources and weaker governance structures impede the implementation and enforcement of environmental regulations. Corruption and lack of transparency exacerbate these issues, allowing environmentally harmful practices to persist. Rapid population growth, urbanisation, and poverty exert additional pressure on natural resources, leading to deforestation, pollution, and habitat destruction (United Nations Climate Change, 2021; Harashima, 2000). Despite these obstacles, positive developments are emerging. Community-based resource management and international cooperation are proving to be promising approaches to improving environmental governance. Programs like the Global Environment Facility⁴ and various UN⁵ initiatives provide crucial support, helping to build capacity and promote sustainable practices in developing countries. Afghanistan, as a less developed country, is encountering growing challenges in environmental governance, which are discussed below.

²For further information, refer to <https://www.epa.gov/>

³Additional information at <https://www.bmu.de/en>

⁴For further information, refer to <https://www.thegef.org/who-we-are>

⁵For detailed information please refer to <https://www.unep.org/>.

History of Environmental Governance in Afghanistan: A Brief Overview

Almost 7000 years ago, the forerunners of the people of Afghanistan introduced and established agricultural practices using technologies that are still in use and valid today (Denniston & Ayres, 1995). They had adopted moderate ways of using natural resources and conserving habitat and environment as part of their culture. But “from the beginning of the advance of the Arab lifestyle and culture and later foreign invaders, the table was turned towards the destruction of all environmental measures that had been in place or the protection of wetland.” (Saba, 2001). After centuries of neglect and inappropriate use of environmental resources, the 80s of the 20th century witnessed movements in regulating the country’s environmental affairs. The Strategy for the Conservation and Management of Natural Resources and Wildlife (SCMNRW) was developed in 1981. The SCMNR represented the initial stride in environmental governance for Afghanistan, furnishing extensive details regarding handling environment-related matters. Afghanistan took some measures for joining global environmental governance by becoming a signatory to various Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). The country signed the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985, thus entering the sphere of global environmental governance. Additionally, on January 28, 1986, Afghanistan also joined the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Although the establishment of SCMNR and the accession to the MEAs were significant developments for integrating environmental concerns into the national policy framework, as NCPR (2016) and Saba (2001) have noted, the Afghan government did not create any mechanism to enforce their implementation in practice.

Following the downfall of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in 1992 and the subsequent outbreak of wars in the country, environmental concerns were entirely neglected. The situation worsened significantly when the Taliban 1.0 captured Kabul in 1996. During the Taliban 1.0 regime (1996-2001), environmental governance was largely absent. The Taliban 1.0’s focus was on consolidating power and enforcing a strict interpretation of Islamic law. There are no documented environmental policies or regulations established during this period (Mohammedi, 2021).


With the collapse of the Taliban 1.0 regime and the establishment of a new political system in late 2001, Afghanistan experienced a significant shift in political discourse, particularly in the field of environmental governance. Various legal, policy, and institutional frameworks were created during this period to protect and preserve the environment. Afghanistan’s constitution, ratified in 2004, enshrined specific provisions for environmental governance. Subsequently, Afghanistan’s Environmental Law was passed in 2007, serving as the foundation for the country’s legal, policy, and institutional frameworks for environmental governance.

An institutional framework for environmental governance was also established, with one of the most important measures being the creation of the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) in 2005. NEPA according to Article 3 of Afghanistan’s 2007 Environment Law, is the principal government body responsible for overseeing the conservation and administration of the environment in the country. It is mandated to monitor environmental quality, assess the effects of

development projects, and enforce environmental laws and regulations (Environment Law, Art. 06). Since its establishment, NEPA has played a crucial role in formulating and implementing regulations, policies, and environmental plans aimed at protecting the environment, conserving natural resources, and promoting sustainable development values in the country. NEPA's organisational structure was relatively small compared to other government institutions in Afghanistan. In 2020, NEPA had a total of 850 employees, with 290 staff members based at its headquarter and 552 personnel deployed across 34 provincial locations (NEPA (2021)). At the top of this hierarchical framework was the Director General (DG), who was appointed by the president without the need for approval by the House of Representatives and was a member of the Afghan government cabinet.

With an annual allocation of more than 330 million Afghanis from the Afghan government's budget (National Statistic and Information Agency (NSIA), 2019), NEPA has been compelled to enhance governance and implement various administrative, financial, and human resources reforms. For instance, NEPA has made efforts to computerise its administrative operations and develop a website to facilitate information and data sharing, thereby achieving a degree of transparency and accountability. In the financial domain, NEPA has attained notable successes. Besides securing the Afghan government's budget, NEPA has initiated 32 projects valued at 895 million US dollars in the field of climate change and has accessed funds from the Global Climate Change Fund.

FIGURE 1: **Structure of NEPA in 2020**



Source-NEPA (2021)

Additionally, NEPA is responsible for implementing several laws and regulations to protect, maintain, and improve the environment. The major rules and regulations formulated by NEPA are as follows: the Law on Conservation of Plant Diversity (O.G. 1229), the Regulations on Controlling Materials Destructive to Ozone Layer (O.G. 894), the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations (O.G. 939), the Clean Air Regulation (O.G. 991), the Regulation on Reduction and Prevention of Air Pollution

(O.G. 991) and many more (NEPA , n.d.). Similarly, to meet its objectives, NEPA has formulated numerous policies and strategies such as the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), the National Environment Strategy (2008), the National Environmental Impact Assessment Policy (2009), the National Environmental Action Plan (2009), the National Waste Management Policy (2010), the National Biodiversity Strategy And Action Plan (2014), the Natural Resource Management Strategy, the Pollution Control And Reduction Policy (2018), the National Water Quality Monitoring Policy (2019), the Action Plan for Decrease and Control of Air Pollution in Kabul (2019), the Five-Year Plan for Control and Decrease of Air Pollution (2020) and many more (NEPA , n.d.).

To align with international environmental governance standards, NEPA on behalf of Afghanistan, has also signed and accessioned multiple international treaties such as such as UNFCCC, UNCBD, Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal and other have been signed and accessioned between 2001 and 2021 (NEPA , n.d.). Moreover, NEPA contributed to regional decision-making processes, particularly in the realm of environmental governance, by being a member of various regional organisations and groups such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and others.

NEPA's efforts extend to protecting natural resources, preserving ecosystems, and controlling environmental pollution. Since its inception, NEPA has designated nine areas and ecosystems as protected zones. They are as follows: Wakhan National Park, Band-e Amir National Park, Dasht-i-Nawar Waterfowl Sanctuary, Bamiyan Plateau Protected Landscape, Darqad (Takhar) Wildlife Reserve, Imam Sahib (Kunduz) Wildlife Reserve, Kol-i-Hashmat Khan Waterfowl Sanctuary, Nuristan National Park and Wildlife Reserve, Pamir-i-Buzurg Wildlife Reserve and Koh-e Baba (Shah Foladi) Protected Landscape. In the area of biodiversity conservation, NEPA has identified 149 species, including mammals, birds, reptiles, fish and plants, that are at risk of extinction and has taken some conservation measures to protect them (NEPA, 2022).

Undoubtedly, various national and international organisations were involved in environmental governance. The major government agencies that played a role in environmental governance include the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and Irrigation (MALI), the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD), the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW), the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP), etc. According to NEPA (2021), its major international partners include the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (UNFAO), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the European Union (EU), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Despite these initiatives, environmental governance under the rule of IRoA was facing numerous and escalating challenges. These included insecurity and lack of political support, complex administrative processes, insufficient human and financial

resources, poor cooperation among relevant institutions, and limited public awareness (NEPA, 2020). These issues hindered the effectiveness of environmental governance, leading to poorly managed environmental problems that worsened over time. Air, water, and soil pollution were significant issues, causing thousands of deaths each year (Batson, 2013; Shroder, 2012; Flores, 2019). Poor industrial and urban waste management, especially in major cities like Kabul, exacerbated these problems. Additionally, deforestation, the reduction of biological diversity, and the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources posed further challenges (Mawdodi, 2016)

The Taliban 2.0's Stance on Environmental Governance

The Taliban, an ultraconservative political and religious faction that emerged at the beginning of the 1990s, has sought to establish a pure Islamic government in Afghanistan since its inception (Britannica, 2023). However, they have consistently rejected the use of diplomacy, instead relying on armed conflict to achieve their objectives (Gritzner, 2007). The group has shown little regard for internationally accepted values, including human rights and environmental protection. During their first period in power from 1994 to 2001, the Taliban focused primarily on consolidating their control rather than addressing social, economic, and political challenges. Environmental protection was not a priority, and there is no record of written policies or practical measures taken by the group in this regard. After their government fell, the Taliban waged a guerrilla war against the Afghan government for nearly two decades. During this period, they disrupted the enforcement of laws, regulations, and environmental policies in various parts of the country. Additionally, reports indicate that the group has exploited natural resources illegally and unsustainably, causing significant environmental damage.

By capturing power in August 2021, the Taliban 2.0 has dismantled all the previous democratic mechanisms and reinstated the authoritarian Islamic Emirate, mirroring the Taliban 1.0 governance during their first regime ("Theocracy Taliban Zeed Ejmaa Milli Ast," 2022). This model of governance, as stated by Sabir Kamali⁶, is based on their interpretation of Islamic laws, and aims to establish an Islamic government grounded in Sharia principles, prioritising religious doctrine over democratic values (personal communication, July 9, 2024). The Taliban 2.0 governance structure, as stated by Mansor Nader⁷ is strictly hierarchical, with the Supreme Leader at the apex, followed by various councils and regional commanders (personal communication, July 9, 2024). This centralised decision-making process lacks transparency and accountability. Citizens' voices are heavily suppressed, with media and public discourse strictly regulated to conform to Taliban 2.0 ideologies (Graham, 2023). Regulatory quality is poor, as policies are driven by religious precepts rather than empirical evidence or public needs. The rule of law under Taliban 2.0 is marked by swift, harsh justice, often bypassing formal legal processes and resulting in arbitrary arrests and punishments (Amnesty International, 2022). Political stability under

⁶ Sabir Kamali (alias given by the author as respondent prefers to stay anonymous), a former member of Afghanistan's Parliament participated in the interview conducted via Google Meet

⁷ Mansor Nader (alias given by the author as respondent prefers to stay anonymous), a former official at NEPA, participated in the interview conducted via Google Meet

Taliban 2.0 rule is fragile, facing resistance from various groups, including remnants of the former government, ethnic minorities, and international actors (Rawadari, 2023). Karim Setiz⁸ stated that while the regime claims strict control over corruption with severe punishments, nepotism and favouritism are rampant, especially in provinces (personal communication, July 17, 2024). Governance effectiveness is hindered by the absence of professional bureaucrats and a reliance on religious clerics who often lack the necessary administrative skills (Hussaini, 2023). This style of governance has had a profound impact on Afghanistan: the economy is in disarray, human rights are severely restricted, particularly for women and minorities, and the country is largely isolated from the international community (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Consequently, Afghanistan has experienced widespread suffering, economic decline, and a deterioration in the human condition. (Mohammedi, 2021).

The Taliban 2.0 regime, as stated by Fariha Sabit⁹ environmental governance mirrors its overall governing style. It has struggled to utilise these facilities effectively despite inheriting established environmental management systems (personal communication, July 11, 2024). The regime's approach to environmental protection has been hindered by a complex interplay of political, administrative, financial, and social challenges.

The main challenge to effective environmental governance under Taliban rule is deeply political, rooted in the regime's ideology and performance, with both internal and external implications. Internally, environmental governance has not garnered the necessary support from Taliban leaders and has not become a priority. Samsor Fazil¹⁰ noted that the government cabinet's cancellation of NEPA's membership has significantly weakened the department's ability to contribute to the national decision-making process, particularly in mainstreaming environmental issues into national policies (personal communication, July 5, 2024). This lack of political support is also evident in weakened inter-departmental cooperation and the reduction of financial, administrative, and human resources, which will be discussed further below. Ongoing conflicts and continuous political instability have further impeded the effective planning and implementation of environmental policies (Rawadari, 2023). As a result, Taliban forces often operate outside established legal frameworks, leading to the inconsistent enforcement of laws and environmental regulations. Externally, the regime's lack of recognition and international isolation has led to the suspension of support from countries, donors, and international organisations for environmental protection (International Crises Group, 2023). Under Taliban control, Afghan environmental institutions have lost access to regional and international platforms, hindering their participation in global environmental circles and decisions ("Taliban:

⁸ Karim Setiz (alias given by the author as respondent prefers to stay anonymous), a former official at NEPA, participated in the interview conducted via Google Meet


⁹ Fariha Sabit (alias given by the author as respondent prefers to stay anonymous), an Afghan environmental expert, participated in the interview conducted via Google Meet

¹⁰ Samsor Fazil (alias given by the author as respondent prefers to stay anonymous), an Afghan environmental expert, participated in the interview conducted via Google Meet

Jahan dar masayel zest mohiti ba ma hamkari namikund,” 2024). The non-recognition of the Taliban by the international community means that NEPA has lost access to international financial support such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Global Environment Facility, and the Adaptation Fund (AF) (NEPA, 2022). According to a NEPA report, 32 environmental projects worth \$895 million have been suspended by donors (NEPA, 2022). Additionally, professional support from UNEP for the Ozone Office has ceased due to lack of resources (NEPA, 2022; NEPA, 2023)

Administrative weaknesses present another significant challenge to environmental governance, leading to issues such as institutional fragility, centralisation, lack of transparency, accountability, corruption and nepotism within NEPA. NEPA is suffering from reduced capacity, expertise, and resources necessary for effective environmental management. Specialisation within this institution is plagued by patrimony, kinship, and group affiliations. Since the Taliban’s rise to power, qualified experts have been removed from decision-making positions, and the institution is now led by mullahs who often lack university education. For instance, NEPA’s DG and provincial directors in all 34 provinces are member of the Taliban 2.0 who are mullahs (clergymen) or loyalists of the regime (Nazari, 2024). Additionally, there has been a significant reduction in the number of employees. NEPA, which had 850 employees in 2020 (NEPA, n.d.-c), now has only 700 (NEPA, 2022). Furthermore, female employees are prohibited from working in their offices.

Figure2: Structure of NEPA Under the Taliban 2.0



Source-NEPA (2022)

Centralisation of authority, a longstanding issue in NEPA, has worsened under Taliban 2.0 rule. The regime’s authoritarian and exclusive governance style leaves little room for policy input from provinces and localities, sidelining local environmental initiatives and diminishing governance effectiveness at provincial and local levels. In addition, the Taliban 2.0 governance approach is fundamentally incompatible with participatory decision-making, leading to the suspension of

mechanisms previously established to involve relevant institutions and parties, such as the National Wildlife Committee, the High Commission for Air Pollution Prevention, the National Environmental Advisory Committee, local environmental advisory committees, and environmental volunteer councils. National organisations, including parliamentary commissions, political parties, and civil organisations active in environmental fields, have also become inactive, resulting in a lack of participatory mechanisms (“Hukumat Taliban Faaliathai Ahzab Siasi Ra Dar Afghanistan Mammo Aelan Kard,” 2023)

Transparency and accountability within NEPA have been severely compromised (Graham, 2023). Mechanisms like regular reporting and the publication of important and reliable information through websites and other channels have been significantly weakened. The Taliban government, and NEPA specifically, have withheld information about the budget and its details from the public (“Tasweeb Budja 1403 Hokumat Taliban Az Sooie Hibatullah Akhondzada: Joziat Aan Baraie Dowomen Saal Hamagani Nashod,” 2024). Additionally, critical environmental information regarding the extraction of natural resources, such as gold mines in Badakhshan, emerald mines in Panjshir, and coal mining operations, remains undisclosed.

Financial challenges are among the significant problems that NEPA is struggling with. An inadequate budget, rooted in the economic crisis and the reduction of international aid, has greatly weakened the effectiveness of environmental governance. NEPA’s budget has been reduced from 331.04 million Afghani in 2019 to 173.5 million Afghani in 2022 (NSIA, 2019; NEPA, 2022). The lack of foreign investment and support, as previously mentioned, has diminished opportunities for sustainable development and environmental protection initiatives due to instability and sanctions.

The ideologisation of environmental rules and regulations adds another layer of complexity. Taliban 2.0 officials view the 2007 Environmental Law and existing regulations through the lens of Sharia law. NEPA’s 2022 annual report indicates that officials have identified elements in the 2007 Environmental Law and six other regulations that are incompatible with their interpretation of Sharia. Consequently, they have decided to revise these laws and regulations to align with their Sharia-based perspective (NEPA, 2022).

Social challenges such as limited awareness, lack of public education, cultural attitudes, and displacement and urbanisation present significant hurdles for the government under Taliban 2.0. There is a pervasive lack of public awareness and education about environmental issues, hindering community participation in environmental governance. Traditional methods and cultural attitudes towards the use of natural resources, which often conflict with modern environmental governance principles, further complicate the implementation of sustainable practices. Additionally, ongoing conflicts, instability, and recent natural disasters have led to significant internal displacement and rapid urbanisation, putting additional stress on the environment and complicating governance efforts.

These governance challenges contribute to various environmental issues that are outlined below:

Air And Water Pollution and Contamination: Under the Taliban 2.0 government, air and water pollution and contamination have significantly worsened. Air pollution in the capital city, Kabul, is often referred to as the “silent killer” because despite

causing 5000 deaths each year (Hussaini, 2023), it remains largely unaddressed by the government. This pervasive issue continues to claim lives quietly, particularly affecting the city's elderly and children. In Kabul, the capital city, only 10% of residents have access to safe drinking water, highlighting a severe scarcity. According to a report by Amo TV, Kabul residents are compelled to spend between 400 and 500 Afghanis each week on water delivered by tankers, due to a persistent decline in urban water supply services. Adding to the concern, UNICEF has issued a warning that Kabul's underground water resources could be depleted by 2030 ("Milal Motahed: Aab Zirzamani Kabul Momken Ta Sal 2030 Ba Payan Berasad," 2024). The situation in other provinces is even more alarming, with many regions facing dire conditions regarding clean water availability (Hussaini, 2023). This dire environmental scenario underscores the critical challenges faced by Afghanistan in ensuring basic environmental health and safety.

Deforestation: Historically, the Taliban has been implicated in the destruction of Afghanistan's natural resources. In the past, selling and smuggling wood to Pakistan was a significant source of income for the group (Hussaini, 2023). Despite their return to power and their professed commitment to governance and citizen welfare, the Taliban 2.0 remains entangled in their own interests. Reports indicate that members of the group continue to engage in illegal logging and the smuggling of wood to Pakistan (Kawa, 2024; Akrami, 2022). Conflicts among Taliban 2.0 members over the exploitation of forest resources have further exacerbated environmental degradation. For instance, in 2022, disputes over the distribution of pine seeds led to a forest fire in the Nurgram region of Nuristan province (Hussaini, 2023). Such internal disagreements and ineffective management have resulted in numerous forest fires in the eastern provinces since the group's resurgence, leading to extensive deforestation (Nazari, 2024). In Litchlam, Monogi district, around a thousand green trees were reportedly cut down ("Afrad Naashnaas Sadha Darakht Raa Dar Jungle Kunar Qata Kordand," 2023). Taliban 2.0 officials in NEPA confirm that the forests of Nuristan are being ruthlessly exploited with chainsaws under the group's control (Rawnaq, 2021).

Unsustainable Use of Natural Resources: Under the Taliban 2.0 regime, the management of Afghanistan's natural resources has become increasingly unsustainable and unprofessional. Mining activities have been conducted in a haphazard manner, with minimal regard for environmental impact or waste management (Nazari, 2013). Furthermore, the smuggling of medicinal and natural herbs has escalated dramatically. Notably, the Yame plant (*ephedra viridis*), a valuable natural resource, has been extensively harvested and exploited for drug production in unprecedented quantities over the past three years (Kawa, 2024). Similarly, the Eila Rang (*alkanna tinctoria*) plant, which serves both medical and industrial purposes, is being cut and smuggled in an unprofessional manner, further compounding the issue (Farzam, 2023).

Climate Change: Afghanistan, under the control of the Taliban 2.0, is currently struggling with the severe crisis of climate change. While this country has a very small share (0.8%), it is among the six countries in the world that are most vulnerable to climate change (Kawa, 2024). The effects of climate change, changes in humidity, the season of snow and rain, and devastating floods have severely damaged the environment in the country and made the cycle of poverty and hunger faster. ("Taliban: Afghanistan Ba Asaraat Manfi Taghiyrat Aqlimi Mawaja Ast," 2023), citing

the Taliban 2.0 government's Ministry of Natural Disaster Management, reports that 1,202 people died and 2,159 were injured in Afghanistan due to natural disasters in 2022. Additionally, 10,808 residential houses were completely destroyed, 23,140 were partially destroyed, and 147,000 acres of agricultural land were ruined by floods and earthquakes. Tasnim News Agency, quoting Abdul Qahar Balkhi, the spokesman of the Taliban 2.0 government's foreign ministry, writes that "Afghanistan has lost two billion dollars from climate change this year alone." ("Aasib Du Milliard Dollari Afghanistan Az Tagheerat Aqlimi Dar Yak Saal," 2022). Under Taliban 2.0 rule, natural disasters are not sufficiently informed, warnings are not given, and after the occurrence of disasters, the affected people are not reached. Another consequence of these disasters is the increase in the number of internally displaced people which the regime does not have the ability to manage the crisis and reach the victims; as a result, this type of migration brings life risks for the displaced people (Hussaini, 2023). The lack of resources, consecutive droughts, and the regime's limited understanding of the environment and climate change have led to deforestation, desertification, and intensified environmental destruction. (Kawa, 2024). The United Nations writes that Afghanistan is the sixth most affected country in the world in terms of climate threats, and this challenge is rooted in political and governance issues and problems in accessing financial resources ("Afghanistan Dar Labe Partgahi Taghieerat Virangar Aqlimi," 2022)

Mine and Explosive Blasts: According to Afghanistan International, citing the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid in Afghanistan, 292 civilians were killed by mine and explosive blasts in the first six months of 2024. Additionally, mines and explosives have endangered approximately 3.4 million people throughout the year ("Dar Shash Mah Guzashteh '292 Nafar' Dar Afghanistan Korbani Infajar Main Wa Mawad Monafjarah Shudand," 2024).

FIGURE 3: Taliban 2.0 soldiers pose with hunted Vulture



Source- MelliunIran (2021)

Illegal and Cruel Hunting of Birds and Animals: Another challenge stemming from the Taliban 2.0's lack of effective environmental governance is the illegal and cruel hunting of birds and animals. Over the past twenty years, they have hunted numerous birds and animals for sport in areas under their control (MelliunIran, 2021). A further concern is a \$42 million contract the regime signed with foreign tourists, particularly Qatari Arabs, allowing them to hunt a kind of bird called Houbara ("Emzayi Qarardad 42 Million Dollari; Taliban Az Kharjyha Poul Migirad Wa Bah Anha Ijaazah Shekar Medhad," 2022). Despite this bird being classified as endangered, with a global population estimated at only around 300,000, the agreement permits its hunting, exacerbating the threat to its survival (Vafaei, 2022).

Conclusion

Afghanistan, a country blessed with diverse landscapes and ecosystems, has been grappling with severe challenges for decades. War and instability have decimated infrastructure and governance, with the environment bearing the brunt of the devastation. Rampant pollution, biodiversity loss, and resource depletion have led to catastrophic consequences, including mass casualties, health crises, diminished quality of life, and economic ruin. Effective environmental management is, therefore, paramount for Afghanistan's recovery and stability, as it can mitigate human and financial losses while fostering sustainable development. Under the previous IRoA, significant strides were made in establishing environmental protection frameworks. NEPA was instrumental in developing and implementing environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Despite these efforts, NEPA faced numerous challenges, including organisational weaknesses, lack of accountability, and ineffective enforcement, hindering environmental progress. The rise of Taliban 2.0 to power in 2021 ushered in a new era of governance marked by authoritarianism and a decline in democratic principles. This transition has intensified the challenges faced by public institutions, including NEPA. NEPA, responsible for environmental protection, has seen a drastic decline in its capacity to fulfil its duties. Support, both social and political, has diminished, and its administrative efficiency and financial resources have significantly waned. Moreover, international financial and technical support for NEPA has been suspended due to the regime's policies and governance. Major international organisations, including UNEP, UNDP, USAID, and the World Bank, have halted environmental projects worth approximately one billion dollars. NEPA has also lost its position in regional and international platforms and its ability to participate in regional and international decision-making processes. Consequently, environmental challenges have intensified, with pollution, deforestation, illegal mining, and wildlife trafficking posing significant threats. To address these challenges, strategic actions are essential. First, NEPA's institutional capacity must be rebuilt through training programs and enhanced internal accountability measures to ensure effective policy implementation. Afghanistan's government should also seek to restore international partnerships for environmental projects by aligning its policies with global environmental standards and demonstrating a commitment to sustainable practices. This could help regain access to crucial financial and technical support from bodies like UNEP and the World Bank. Furthermore, NEPA should collaborate with local communities to encourage sustainable resource management, enhancing public support and ownership of environmental initiatives. Lastly, investing in environmentally sound technologies and promoting public awareness on issues such

as pollution and biodiversity loss can empower communities to participate in environmental preservation actively. Such multifaceted efforts would contribute to Afghanistan's environmental resilience and its broader path toward sustainable development.

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