Party Politics in Goa: An analysis of defection cases of splits & mergers- A case Study of Third Goa Legislative Assembly (1999-2002)

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Political defections are antithetical to the principles of democratic governance. They betray the electoral mandate of the voters; decay the fundamental doctrine of the party system; weaken the elected governments; and reduce the value of politics from a transformative tool for social change to serving individual interests, a political business cycle. The last two aspects can be seen more frequently in Indian politics, especially in the post-coalition phase.

Defection, toppling of the Government, and instability dominated Goa's politics during 1999-2002. Indian National Congress received the people's mandate with absolute majority to govern the State and politics of Goa in the General elections held in 1999. The period- 1999-2002 witnessed various splits, mergers, and formation of splinter groups in the Assembly which led to the collapse and formation of the Governments and ultimately led to the dissolution of the assembly. The main objective of this research is to understand the party politics in Goa in the context of lawful defection cases leading to splits & mergers in the political parties in order to attain power. The major hypothesis developed for this research is that defection versus loyalty and ability versus incompetence to rule the State is one among the various issues that Goan politics has faced during 1999-2002. The present paper attempts to study defections in Goa during the said period by locating it in the broader context of theories of representation and its various models. Using a qualitative, inferential approach it looks at the case study of the third Goa legislative assembly (1999-2002) wherein significant patterns related to defections are analysed.

Keywords: Party Politics, Splits, Merger, defection, Goa

Political Defections have been a common phenomenon in India, particularly ever since coalition politics to centre state in national and state politics since the early 1990s. They have therefore renewed scholarly interest in politics of representation. Hannah Pitkin's conceptual framing of representation as 'acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them[1] aptly sums up the meaning of political representation. From an analytical framework, Representation can be Trustee-where elected representatives are given the responsibility to govern by the voters and they in turn ought to serve the people as they think best, Delegate-where the elected representatives are delegated the responsibility to govern in the interest of the electorate and Partisan.

The malady of defection has been plaguing Goa since 1990. Defections and counter-

defections in political parties have been a regular feature of Goa's political history. This has made Goa politically unstable in the cluster of states in the country. The political history of Goa shows that since the first assembly formation in 1963, the situation has worsened in all the subsequent elections in the 1990's decade which witnessed large-scale defections leading to the formation of ten governments between 1989-1999. The state electorates stand to reject the defectors seems to not affect this increasing trend. Two assemblies were dissolved prematurely.

Survey of Literature

Defections in India have been a political concern since the independence of India which motivated the parliament to set up various committees to recommend ways to curtail the evil of defections. Y.B. Chavan, former Home Minister of India described 'defections' as a 'national malady' which was 'eating into the very vitals of our democracy' (Kashyap, 2003). To regulate such political behaviours of elected legislators, institutional attempts were made by the Parliament by introducing the 52nd constitutional amendment, and changes to them have been made vide the 91st constitutional amendment to curb the defections in India, however, no such major difference was seen in India and also in Goa. Maria do Ceu Rodrigues and Solano da Silva mention that the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1985 was expected to restore the sanctity of the legislature and put the lid on political manipulation but in Goa, it could only check retail defections leaving ample scope for wholesale defections (Rodrigues, 2004). The period from 1987-1999 is aptly described by Peter de Souza as the 'period of politics of pragmatism' (de Souza, 1999). One of the milestones in the political development of Goa as highlighted by de Souza is the passing of the anti-defection Act in 1985 of which one of the major consequences was that instead of individuals defecting, groups defect, with each time one-third of the legislature party shifting allegiances, from the party on which they were elected to parties, who they had opposed during the elections (deSouza & Sridharan, 2006). With this background, an attempt to identify the cases of lawful splits and mergers is discussed in this research.

Background of Political Defections in Goa

Historically it was during the first assembly session itself that the politics of splinter groups and defections began. It was then, that the twelve-member United Goans Party (UGP) led by Jack de Sequeira, was split and six of its legislators formed a separate group. Six rebels were under the leadership of Alvaro de Loyola Furtado.[1] Soon in the 1967 elections UG (Futado) group fielded six candidates, however except one; no one could even save their security deposit. In the second legislative assembly between April 1967 to March 1972, Chief Minister Dayanand Bandodkar faced troubled weather as a group of seven legislators from his ruling Maharasthrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) revolted against him under the leadership of K.B. Naik of the ruling and withdrew their support.[2] Efforts to call a truce between both the groups failed but the MGP Chief Minister won the vote of confidence on the floor of the house

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[1] The splinter group was known as United Goans (Furtado- Pimento) group. The group comprised of Inno Pimenta, Joaquim Luis Araujo, Sebestiao Mazarelo, Mavarilio Furtado, Urminda Mascarenhas de Lima Laitao.

[2] The Group led by K.B. Naik included MGP MLAs- Anthony D'Souza, Gopal Mayekar, Manju Gaonkar, GajananPatil, DattaramChopdekar&JivaGaonkar.

when a group of five UG (Sequeira) Party MLAs from opposing benches voted in favour of the Chief Minister. The splinter groups of UG (S) called them UG (Progressive) and were led by Orlando Sequeira Lobo.[3] Later two of the MGP rebels joined Congress while others formed the Nav Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (NMGP), but none of them could win the 1972 elections. Among those who defected from UGP too lost the subsequent elections. It was observed that there existed a trend of rejecting the defectors by the voters.

The sudden demise of the Chief Minister Bandodkar witnessed his daughter Shashikala Kakodkar taking over the reign in August 1973 but the differences cropped up by the end of the term of the third assembly within the ruling MG Party when two legislators Jaisinghrao Rane and Punaji Achrekar from MGP resigned and formed a separate group. Soon both of them joined the Janata Party but could not execute their reentry in the assembly of the 1977 elections. However, Kakodkar managed to regain power as there was once again a split in the UG Party under Anant Naracinva Naik, and later on the eve of the elections of 1977 this UG (Naik) group merged with Congress and the UG (Sequeira) group were the original UG Party, merged with Janata Party; with this disintegration of UG party helped MG Party to win the elections of 1977. By April 1979, discontentment started brewing within the ruling MGP following agitations by students and traditional fishermen, resulting in some legislators changing sides. However, the Kakodkar government could not survive this coup as her minister Shankar Lad resigned and joined the rebels. This move had the support of the leader of opposition Anant Naracinva Naik of Congress Party.

Goa saw a unique mass defection in 1980, during the fifth assembly. The Congress (Urs) had won 19 seats and secured an absolute majority in the House, while the MGP had to be satisfied with only seven seats of which five joined the Congress party. Overnight the Congress (Urs) merged with Congress (I). This gave an edge to Pratapsingh Rane who emerged as a consensus candidate to become the first Congress Chief Minister in Goa, though Wilfred d' souza and Anant (Babu) Naik were also strong contenders for the post. When, D'souza, along with three others left the Congress and formed the Goa Congress, a regional party. During the Sixth Assembly elections in 1984 the Congress once again secured a majority in the assembly with 18 Legislators, MGP's strength rose from two to eight.

 A new trend of coalition government began after the 1989 elections which were, the first elections after Goa attained Statehood, in which the Congress could win only 20 seats out of 40. The MGP's strength increased from eight in 1984 to 18 in 1989 and two rebel Congressmen were elected as independents. Pratapsingh Rane from the Congress party managed to form the government with the support of independent MLAs, however, the government collapsed due to a split in the Congress as some of the MLAs were dissatisfied with their exclusion from the cabinet. These dissatisfied Congress MLAs formed the Goan People's Party (GPP).[4] Churchill Alemao became the Chief Minister on March 27, 1990, promising to relinquish the post after the

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[3] The UG (Progressive) comprised of – Orland Sequeira Lobo, Elu Miranda, Roque Barreto, Valentine Sequeira & Abdul Razak.

[4] GPP comprised – Churchill Alemao, Farrel Furtado, Mauvin Godinho, Somnath Zuwarkar, Luis Alex Cardoz and John Baptist Gonsalves besides Speaker Luis Proto Barbosa. The GPP along with MGP MLAs and an Independent MLA Babu Naik staked claim to form the new government.

speaker Luis Proto Barbosa tendered his resignation to take up the reins of the government. Alemao stood by his promise and resigned on April 14, 1990, to pave the way for Barbosa, who formed the first "Jumbo Cabinet" by giving representation to six legislators each of the GPP and the MGP. The coalition experiment could last only ten months as deputy chief minister, Ramakant Khalap, of the MGP withdrew his support and also took two GPP MLAs on his side. As the 13-member Congress did not support any group, the assembly was kept under suspended animation during which two of the MGP legislators were disqualified under the anti-defection act by the Speaker of the Goa Legislative Assembly Surendra Sirsat who was an MGP legislator and the remaining MGP group split further. MGP splinter group led by Ravi Naik became the new chief minister with the support of the Congress Legislature Party. The MGP (Ravi Naik) group was later merged into the Congress. His government received a major blow when the High Court disqualified him along with two others from the membership of the House who were disqualified by the Speaker Surendra Sirsat as Ravi Naik bowed out; Dr Wilfred D'souza took over as the chief minister. The eighth assembly from 1994-99 also had a fractured mandate. The Congress had 18 seats while the MGP had 12, BJP four, and UGDP three legislators. Pratapsingh Rane became the chief minister after a four-member splinter group of MGP extended their support to his government. This government was also not able to complete the full tenure due to a split in Congress, two successive governments under D' Souza and later under Luizinho Faleiro came to power and due to further disintegration of Congress, the assembly was dissolved.

Significance & relevance of the present study

When one analyzes the political defections in India, one may observe three distinct waves. The first was in the latter half of the 1960s wherein Congress faced several challenges and these challenges attempted to displace it in the State legislature by way of political defections. The second wave was with the introduction of the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act 1985 wherein an attempt was to end the free movement and regulate the behavior of legislators. Finally, collective defections wherein the law discouraged individual movement, it incentivized a collective movement of legislators since it laid down specific numbers to legitimize defections. At this backdrop, the elections of 1999 become crucial for the present study as the legislators without resigning were able to form a group of one-third of the legislature party, lawfully creating a split in the original party which was recognized easily by the Speaker and were legally changing the floor without attracting the provisions of defections. Therefore the present case study of 1999-2002 of the Goa Legislative Assembly is an important example of various cases of splits & mergers.

The key aspect of these cases deals with splits wherein one-third of the members of the legislature party split; they could not attract disqualifications as per paragraph 3 of the Tenth schedule. However, in 2003 through the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, paragraph 3 was deleted and one number was increased from one-third to two-thirds. However, as the Goa Legislative Assembly has only 40 members, it has become easier for political parties to lawful mergers.

This phase from 1999-2002 dominated by lawful splits and mergers of Legislative parties became an important base for understanding the dynamics of modern-day defections in Goa. It is just the number has changed from one-third to two-thirds but

the nature of defections has remained the same which makes this research more relevant. The phase between 1999-2002 in Goan politics is bizarre when compared to the past because dominant political parties appear to be actively cheering splits and shifts. The anti-defection law and control of institutions were weaponized by the dominant political parties to intervene in the internal workings of the regional political parties and break them lawfully. This phase has seen that legislators were switching sides even though it does not count toward the making of Government.

Case Study of Goa Legislative Assembly 1999-2002

The Tenth Schedule, as it was originally enacted, contained a provision to protect legislators when an original party splits and one-third of the legislators form another group. As per para 3 of the Tenth Schedule held that prima facie proof of split is necessary to be produced before the Speaker to satisfy him that such a split has taken place that for the split. This provision was deleted by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act of 2003 when it was found that it was being abused by the legislators. In Goa, cases of a split in the Congress Party during 1999-2002 and their subsequent splinter groups within the faction and their merger into National political parties were the hallmarks of this period which is analysed in the present study. The gradual movement from two regional-party competitive systems to a two-national-party competitive system was observed during this phase and the gradual movement of power from centrifugal to centripetal force was noticed. This process was one of the major factors that aided defections in Goa.

Congress, which won 21 seats in the general elections to the Goa legislative assembly-1999 formed the Government under the leadership of Luizinho Faleiro on 9th June 1999. Soon after the formation of the Government and the Cabinet, dissatisfaction within the Congress MLAs was observed. Faleiro took defensive steps to prevent the dissidents from reaching the required numbers to form lawful splits in Congress and keep off the anti-defection law. He started engineering defections in the other regional parties like Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP), and United Goans Democratic Party (UGDP), projecting a picture that these regional parties had themselves preferred to join the Congress. Though successful in admitting the UGDP legislators elected during the 1999 elections- Suresh Parulekar (Calangute) & Jose Philip D'Souza (Vasco) into its party fold. This increased the strength of INC from 21 to 23. This defection of two UGDP MLAs and their merger into the Congress Party was not liked by the section within the Congress Legislature Party (CLP) On the eve of the Parliamentary elections of September 1999, the Congress engineered a split in the MGP and took two legislators out of four elected- Ramakant Khalap (Mandrem) and Prakash Velip (Quepem) into Congress under the banner of MGP (Khalap) faction, this increased the strength of the Congress from 23 to 25. Realizing Faleiro's move, the dissidents also became more active. The rival camps within the Congress were ready for a battle of wits and guts over the parliamentary elections fiasco issue. The spark was ignited by the MLAs who were aspiring for ministerial positions in the cabinet. Secondly, the selection of candidates in both parliamentary constituencies coupled with the dissident activities. Many Congress leaders pointed out that they could not work with Ramakant Khalap[5], against whom they had worked in the parliamentary elections in 1996 & 1998. Though the dissidents planned to cite the party's defeat for a change in the leadership, Luizinho Faleiro who was also the President of GPCC, succeeded in convincing the party high command that the party

had to lose the seats due to the dissident activity. The rival camp within Congress was ready for dissidence on the election fiasco issue.

On 19th November Congress MLA and health minister in the LuizinhoFaleiro cabinet, Francisco Sardinha led a revolt along with ten other legislators by forming a separate group INC (Sardinha) which was named Goa People's Congress Party (GPCP) and claimed to form the Government with the support of BJP and other allies. Francisco Sardinha along with Dayanand Narvekar, Victoria Fernandes, Subhash Shirodkar, Somanath Zuwarkar, Alexio Sequiera, Francis Silveira, Mauvin Godinho, Arecio de Souza, Venkatesh Dessai& Francis de Souza formed Goa People's Congress Party (GPCP) and communicated the formation of this separate party to the Speaker, Pratapsingh Rane and claimed to form the Government with the support of ten BJP legislators, two MGP legislator, lone NCP member Wilfred D'Souza together they formed Goa Democratic Alliance. Francisco Sardinha was sworn in as Chief Minister of Goa on 24th November 1999. Dissidences within the Congress were responsible for the fall of Faleiro's Government which reduced the Congress's strength to 14.

While giving reasons for the collapse of his government, Luizinho Faleiro pointed out that *"due to my sincere attempts to limit the size of the cabinet, I was a target of attempted coups compelling him to increase the size of his cabinet by another five, in spite of that minister created more problems over portfolios."* He also mentioned that in an attempt to tide over the financial crises, his government plugged the leakages in the revenue generation departments. He alleged that many tax evaders, especially of sales tax and excise duty opposed this move and had attempted to topple his government with the help of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

How Faleiro, his ministers, and bureaucrats were running the government, that it was at this juncture, the others who came out of Congress Legislature Party with Sardinha, and the BJP benefitted the most. Extortion on the one hand and indecision on the other; became the hallmarks of Faleiro's administration. The Meta strip case proved the incapability of Faleiro as a Chief Minister.[6]

On 16th August 2000, once again there was a split in Congress and the five MLAs led by Shaikh Hassan Harron (Mormugao), Suresh Parulekar (Calangute), PrakashVelip (Quepem), Jose Philip D'Souza (Vasco), Filip Neri Rodrigues (Vilim) formed a faction of INC (Shaikh) and extended their unconditional support to Sardinha led Government.The Speaker Pratapsingh Rane recognised the split in the Congress legislature party. Sheikh Hasan while announcing his 'unconditional outside support' to the Sardinha-led government reported that, *"strengthening the hands of Mr. Sardinha was necessary at this juncture as the people of Goa were looking forward to a stable government for overall progress and development of Goa."*

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[5] He was the Congress candidate for the North Goa parliamentary elections of 1999 who lost the elections.

[6] Meta-Strips was established to import and process scrap from Europe to send valuable metals back and dispose of the waste in Goa and got clearance in a record six days. While an Environmental Impact Assessment was conducted, the potential hazards of the industry that included unacceptable levels of toxic and carcinogenic metal fumes and groundwater pollution were not made public. Residents from surrounding villages organised a campaign with road blockades and sit-ins that met police repression resulting in serious injuries and the death of a policeman. The Chief Minister Luizinho Faleiro publically supported this which was reported in Herald 8th September 1999.

In a fast-paced political development in Goa, on 21st October 2000, four congress legislators- Ravi Naik (Ponda) Leader of Opposition, Ramakant Khalap (Mandrem), Sanjay Bandekar (Canacona) and Manohar Azgaonkar (Dhargal) formed a faction-INC (Ravi) and later joined the BJP on the same day. This was one of the rarest occasions in the history of democratic politics of Goa that the Leader of the opposition himself along with other MLAs split from the party to join another. Similarly, on the same day, four out of five legislators from INC (Shaikh)- Shaikh Hassan Harron (Mormugao), Prakash Velip (Quepem), Jose Philip D'Souza (Vasco), Filip Neri Rodrigues (Vilim) joined BJP.These two major mergers helped BJP to increase their strength from 10 to 18. BJP, along with two members of MGP and an independent legislator from Ponguinim constituency Isidor Fernandes formed the coalition and dislodged the Sardhinha government. Manohar Parrikar was sworn in as the Chief Minister of Goa on 24th October 2000.

In another political development, on 7th November 2000, two legislators of GPCP under the banner of GPCP (Dessai) – Venkatesh Dessai (Valpoi) and Francis de Souza (Mapusa) formed a group and merged into BJP.

Meanwhile, Congress was trying to consolidate united opposition thereby strengthening INC. Four legislators of GPCP formed a faction GPCP (Zuwarkar) – Somanath Zuwarkar, Subhash Shirodkar, Victoria Fernandes, and Francis Silveira, merged back into Congress, thereby reducing the number of GPCP to three.They were all admitted into INC by Faleiro. Faleiro retaliated to combine all the forces against the BJP to fight against their policies.On 5th April 2000, GPCP formally joined back the Congress. Out of the remaining three legislators- Francisco Sardinha, and Mauvin Godinho also joined back the Congress.

As all the anti BJP forces were becoming strong in Goa, BJP realizing the threats of defections dissolved the Legislative Assembly to face the elections in June 2002.

Findings & Observations

1) Abuse of Legal provisions under the Tenth Schedule

The provision of 'split' has been grossly misused to engineer multiple divisions in the party, as a result of which the evil of defection has not been checked in the right earnest.

In the case of Goa, between 1999-2002, it is evident that the INC which won thumping majority in the Assembly elections and in order to control the dissidences within INC went on engineering splits in regional parties and their merger into INC resulted in the formation of splinter group within INC known as GPCP; which led to the collapse of Government in November 1999. Further dissatisfied INC legislators in order to gain positions went on splitting the INC which ultimately facilitated the BJP in Goa to expand and form their Government. However, the provision of 'split' was done away with by the 91stConstitutional Amendment Act- 2003. But the removal of the split provision prompted political parties to engineer wholesale defection (merger) instead of smaller groups.

2) Instability

The abuse of the legal provision under the tenth schedule resulted in constant instability in Goa. Within three years Goa experienced three different Governments. Legislators were moving from one splinter group

to another in a lawful manner disrespecting the mandate of the people and changing sides over the floor of the House. Both the National political parties INC-BJP were trying to engulf the regional political parties and their voters.

TABLE 1: **Instability caused due to Splits & Mergers- 1999-2002**

Sr. No	Name of the Chief Minister	Political Party	From	To	Time Period	Reasons
1	LuizinhoFaleiro	INC	09.06.1999	24.11.1999	168 days	The government reduced to a minority
2	Francisco Sardinha	GDA Coalition	24.11.1999	23.10.2000	334 days	Withdrawal of support
3	Manohar Parrikar	BJP led Coalition	24.10.2000	03.06.2002	588 days	Dissolution of Assembly

Source: Staff Reporter. (2000, October 24). Goan politics mired in defections. *The Navhind Times*, p. 3.

3) Easy recognition has encouraged splits & mergers

Acceptance of the claims of splits and subsequent recognition of the split groups without proper examination has encouraged a series of defections during 1999-2002. The Speaker of the Goa Legislative Assembly- Pratapsingh Rane, should have exercised his constitutional authority more judiciously while making decisions on recognizing the splits in the Congress Party. Quick decisions on the recognition of splits, without studying the matter in depth, only encouraged defections.

For example: The split led by Shaikh Hassan Haroon was not proper as there was no split in the party's organization unit as required under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The Split of INC (Ravi) - it's split and the subsequent merger was decided within the shortest possible time.

TABLE 2: **Cases of Splits & Merger- 1999-2002**

Sr. No	Date of Split/ Merger	Political Party	Particulars of the events	Members associated	Remarks
1	4.07.1999	UGDP	Two MLAs Merged into INC.	Suresh Parulekar, Jose Fillip D'Souza	Split in UGDP
2	16.08.1999	MGP	Two MLAs Merged into INC	Ramakant Khalap, PrakashVelip	Split in MGP
3	19.11.1999	INC	11 MLAs formed a separate Group INC (Sardinha) and named it GPCP	Francisco Sardinha, Dayanand Narvekar, Victoria Fernandes, Subhash Shirodkar, Somanath Zuwarkar,	Split in INC

				Alexio Sequiera, Francis Silveira, Mauvin Godinho, Arecio de Souza, Venkatesh Dessai & Francis de Souza	
4	16.08.2000	INC	Five MLAs formed INC (Sheikh Hassan) to support the Sandinha Government	Sheikh Hassan Harron, Filip Neri Rodrigues, Prakash Velip, Jose Fillip D'Souza, Suresh Parulekar	Split in INC
5	21.10.2000	INC	Four MLAs formed INC (Ravi Naik) to support BJP Government	Ravi Naik, Ramakant Khalap, Manohar Azgaonkar, Sanjay Bandekar	Split in INC to merge into BJP
6	21.10.2000	INC (Sheikh)	Four MLAs merged into BJP	Sheikh Hassan Harron, Filip Neri Rodrigues, Prakash Velip, Jose Fillip D'Souza	Merger of INC (Sheikh) into BJP
7	07.11.2000	GPCP (Dessai)	Two MLAs Split from GPCP and formed GPCP (Dessai) to join BJP	Venkatesh Dessai & Francis de Souza	Merger of GPCP (Dessai) into BJP
8	14.12.2000	GPCP (Zuwarkar)	Four MLAS from GPCP formed GPCP (Zuwarkar) to merge into INC	Victoria Fernandes, Subhash Shirodkar, Somanath Zuwarkar, Francis Silveira	Merger of GPCP (Zuwarkar) into INC
9	05.04.2001	GPCP	Two MLAS merged into INC	Francisco Sardinha, Mauvin Godinho	

Source: BJP musters strength to form a new government. (2000, October 22). *The Navhind Times*, p. 1.

4) The distinction between BJP-INC blurred

The distinction between the ruling and the opposition has blurred. The BJP looks like the INC and the INC looks like the BJP. No party stands out from the other. The opposition in its true sense should present itself as a contrasting alternative to the ruling camp, but the lines between the two do not exist

and both of them have become hospitable to floor crossers. Because the name of the game is not public service but capture of power and in this system, the power can be captured only by having the arithmetic right. Both these national political parties were trying to engulf the regional political parties by creating a split in the original parties.

Luizinho Faleiro, to strengthen his government, managed to split the UGDP and MGP. Similarly, BJP too was successful in splitting GPCP, INC (Sheikh) & INC (Ravi) merging them into BJP. BJP is considered as a cadre-based political party, however, it was seen that during 1999-2002 they were admitting anyone straight into the BJP fold purely for political stability. The only reason could be that there was no surer way to consolidate the BJPs individual position in the assembly by raising the number of members from 10 to 18.By encouraging splits and defections BJP proved that the Congress Party was not invincible but on the contrary, a divided house inhabited by diverse groups.However, BJP during 1999-2002 proved that it was not prone to splits, as during this period there was no split in BJP.

Table 1 showcases the gradual process of the national political parties disintegrating the regional forces in Goa. This gradual process led to the change in the epicenter of decision-making. The high command at New Delhi of both these national political parties became a dominant force in the decision-making in Goa. The following table 3 explains the movement of the elected legislators from the political party they got elected and how they moved lawfully by forming splinter groups and mergers thereby misusing the constitutional provisions.

TABLE 3: **Movement of Legislators from one party to another- 1999-2002**

Sr. No	Legislator	Elected	Joined	Moved	Then to
1	F. D'Souza	GRC	NCP	GPCP-GPCP (Dessai)	BJP
2	J. Phillip	UGDP	INC	INC (Shaikh)	BJP
3	S. Parulekar	UGDP	INC	INC (Shaikh)	-
4	R. Khalap	MGP	INC	INC (Ravi)	BJP
5	P. Velip	MGP	INC	INC (Shaikh)	BJP
6	S. Sardinha	INC	GPCP	INC	-
7	D. Narvekar	INC	GPCP	INC	-
8	S. Shirodkar	INC	GPCP	GPCP (Zuwarkar)	INC
9	S. Zuwarkar	INC	GPCP	GPCP(Zuwarkar)	INC
10	V. Fernandes	INC	GPCP	GPCP(Zuwarkar)	INC
11	F. Silveira	INC	GPCP	GPCP (Zuwarkar)	INC
12	V. Dessai	INC	GPCP	GPCP (Dessai)	BJP
13	A. Sequeira	INC	GPCP	GPCP (Sequeira)	INC

1 4	A D'Souza	INC	GPCP	GPCP (Dessai)	-
1 5	M. Godinho	INC	GPCP	INC	-
1 6	S. Hassan	INC	INC (Shaikh)	BJP	-
1 7	F.N Rodrigues	INC	INC (Shaikh)	BJP	-
1 8	S. Bandekar	INC	INC (Shaikh)	BJP	-
1 9	M. Azgaonkar	INC	INC (Shaikh)	BJP	-
2 0	R. Naik	INC	INC (Ravi)	BJP	-

Source: Staff Reporter. (2000, December 29). 2000- A year of Political ups & downs defections take Centre stage. *The Navhind Times*, p. 3.

When we observe table 3, we notice the phenomenon of 'Political Nomadism' which means 'part defection, floor crossing or party hooping.' This has become one of the features of post-statehood democratic politics in Goa, more importantly during 1999-2002; the phenomenon of political nomadism raises different normative issues. Firstly if the various nuanced positions in the literature on representation are reduced to two broad theories, the mandate and the independence theories, where, in the former, the representative is obligatory to represent the needs, interests and wishes of his/her constituents, and in the latter, where his/her obligation is to the 'general good', then we observe that the "political nomad is closer to the independence theory and would appear to draw justification from Edmund Burk's 1774 speech, at the close of poll in Bristol, where he said that parliament was not a corpus of ambassadors from different local interests.... but a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interests that of the whole'." In Goa, these political nomads have often defended their behaviour by saying that they have changed the political party for the 'general good' and that the party on which they won the elections was not following the manifesto, etc.

Secondly, the causes and consequences of such nomadism raise the concern for party systems. While the causes can be mapped concerning both the internal dynamics of party organization and external dynamics of the party system; the consequences can be assessed in terms of its impact on the process of deepening democracy. Political nomadism poses a serious challenge to party oligarchies, particularly, where these oligarchies are representatives of caste and religion. By threatening the party with instability and exit, the new group, in the person of political nomads, are able to make them more accommodative. Here in this case, it was Bharatiya Janata Party which was known for its Hindutva based ideological base accommodated various groups from the Indian National Congress from different religious backgrounds by creating a lawful split in the original party and merging them with BJP without any ideological base.

Conclusion

There will be nothing of Democracy left if we donot stop the slide right now. Defection must stop. The very foundation of democracy is adult franchise one man, one vote, using the franchise voters elect a representative of their constituency to the legislature. Democracy gives freedom to any citizen to offer himself as a candidate for the representative's office; he approaches the voters as an independent or as a member of a party and seeks their patronage on the basis of a distinct ideology,

manifesto and programmes. Among many candidates in the fray the majority of voters choose one to represent them. There cannot be two opinions that each voter who has voted for a particular candidate has made his choice after an evaluation of his party and its ideology, manifesto and programmes or his ideology and programmes if he is an independent.

Defection is a betrayal of the voter's trust. Representation of a constituency is a political contract between the voters and the elected candidates, a contract based on his commitment to a certain ideology and programme. The moment he defects, this political contract is invalidated. The voters have every right to say that the elected candidate has ceased to represent them. Each voter has a right to ask the State to grant him the opportunity to exercise his 'one man, one vote' privilege again to elect a new representative. The law of defection must therefore be re-drafted to make a fresh mandate mandatory for a defector.

Defection is an act that undermines all democratic principles and is complete disrespect to the voters, as there is no ideological reasoning for changing sides. While the reason bandied about by the defecting MLA is development of the constituency, everybody knows that it is the personal development that the MLAs have in mind. The ministerial berths and chairmanships that are distributed to them post the change of sides, are evidence of this. They gain, whether the constituency gain is debatable, and the State definitely does not.

No doubt the Speaker is a constitutional authority, but for the purposes of the Anti-defection Law, the Speaker functions like an adjudicatory authority and he is expected to function within the ambit of the tribunal. The Anti-defection has one escape route for bulk defections, that is, when two thirds (earlier it was one-third) merge, it is the Speaker who accepts that there is a merger, and saves the merging legislators from defection law and they would not be classified as defectors. In cases of adjudication, several times the role of Speaker is observed tilting towards the party to which he belongs to. In view of this the adjudicatory authority vested in him has become controversial and debatable in Indian democracy.

The hypothesis developed around this research proves the fact that political loyalty was not seen during 1999-2002 and an act of repeated defections for ministerial positions and power without understanding their own ability to run the affairs of the state was clearly observed during this period. Political parties irrespective of ideologies continue to do power politics especially when the party is losing its position. It is annoying to note that the government at the Centre is resorting to political defections by identifying and attracting the dissatisfied and discontented leaders in the elected governments. On the strength of the observations and findings of this study and on the basis of the few points discussed above, it is possible to claim that the Hypotheses of this study have been established.

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