

Changing Nature of Populism in India

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In recent times, populism has emerged as a significant political phenomenon across the globe and influencing the prevailing political system in different ways. Therefore, Indian states are no exception. Nevertheless, nowadays, its salience is higher than ever since its reach has expanded across the globe. The Indian States are adopting and witnessing various populist measures in the policy formulation, electoral behaviour, and day-to-day functions of the government. These populist measures have a direct impact on the life of ordinary citizens and the prevailing political system. Populism as a political concept is not something that has emerged recently, but it has a very long history. However, the nature of populism has changed. Generally, the idea of populism is considered regressive, where individual leaders concentrate all the political power and create threats to democratic institutions and democratic values. But the current wave of populism that emerged in the 1990s has some distinction from the early idea of classical populism. Today's populism is labelled as "New Populism", which is progressive and talks about accountability, transparency, and emancipation. In this context, this paper's major aims and objectives are to analyse the changing nature of populism and its implications on ordinary citizens of India, following the interpretive approach of theoretical nuances. This paper is organised into two parts. The first part of the paper primarily focuses on the various definitions of populism and makes a distinction between Old populism and New Populism. The second part of the paper is about India's experiences with populism, followed by the conclusion

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Populism as a political phenomenon is neither a new concept in world politics nor India. Nevertheless, it has recently emerged as the most widely discussed and debated concept in academia, catalysed by the electoral success of Donald Trump and other populist leaders worldwide. The term populism emerged from the Latin word "populus" which means "the People". Populism as a term, was coined in America at the end of the twentieth century to refer to both a political language and a form of political participation in and consistent with the democratic process (Urbinati, 1998). Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2017) believe that populism as a political phenomenon is not a recent phenomenon. It has existed throughout the entire 20th century and, surprisingly, even in the 19th century in the countries like Russia and the United States of America (USA). They further argued that the recent rise of populism in different continents is closely related to the expansion of democratic institutions, governance models, and regimes. However, populism as a political idea has existed

for a very long time, but its precise definitions remain elusive. The recent literature on populism tries to define populism at least in four aspects; in terms of ideology, as a political mobilisation strategy, in terms of style of politics, and finally, as a project of reestablishment across historical and ideological contexts. This article discusses the two definitions of populism that are prominent in academic debates and literature.

Rovira Kaltwasser and Cass Mudde in their book “Populism: A Very Short Introduction” (2017), defines populism as a “thin-centred ideology that considered society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps (The Pure People vs Corrupt Elite) and which argues that politics should be the expression of the *Volonte generale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.06). Further elaborating on the thin-centred ideology, Kaltwasser argues that thin-centred ideologies are those which do not provide answers to the major socio-political questions and are, therefore, compatible with other prominent ideologies. This compatibility of populism with other ideologies allows it to employ the concept of other ideologies and form various subtypes of populism such as left populism and right-wing populism. Paul Taggart (2000), challenges this understanding of Mudde. Taggart argues that populism cannot be considered an ideology because it does not commit to core values. He believes ideologies contain, either explicitly or implicitly, attention to at least one core value, such as equality, freedom, and social equity, populism as an ideology has no such centre to it.

Another prominent definition of populism comes from political scientists who consider populism as a political strategy to mobilise voters. This definition is more pronounced among sociologists and political scientists working on Latin American politics. Paul D. Kenny defines populism as a “political mobilisation strategy where populist leaders seek to establish unmediated links with voters in their quest to gain and retain the power” (Kenny, 2017, p.02). In this understanding of populism, individual leaders play a significant role in the concentration of power and presenting themselves as the sole representative of ordinary citizens. In many instances, political parties became a shell, completely dependent upon and enslaved to the populist leader. In his analysis of ethnocentric populism in Latin America, Madrid also argues that sometimes “populism takes the form of particular economic policies and strategy of mass mobilisation” (Madrid, 2008, p. 482). When we come to analyse the concept of populism, the above-cited definition can give us an instinct of what populism is all about but does not provide a systematic understanding of its core. In this context, the best approach is that of Meny and Surel (2000; 2002). According to Meny and Surel, there are three core characteristics essential to the concept of populism, (i) The people (ii) The Elites (iii) The Primacy of the People. Taggart (2000) concurs with the initial two of these three core characteristics, but for the third characteristic, he focuses on the necessity of a “sense of extreme crisis” for populism to arise.

Therefore, there are indeed multiple definitions and approaches of populism to analyse and explain the success of various populist parties and leaders across the continents. Still, these are insufficient to address the current political events in Indian politics. Hence, we need a broader definition to understand and explain the current debates and events in Indian politics. In this context, “populism consists both of a distinctive form of political mobilisation strategy (Weyland;2001, Kenny;2017) and an ideology that considers society is ultimately divided into two homogenous and antagonistic camps “the people” vs “the elite”. These corrupt elites may be the established politicians, businessmen, and any other group of people who influenced

the policies of the government for their hidden social, political, and economic interests. There is a lack of scholarly agreement in regard to defining attributes of populism; however, the majority accepted that all variants of populism include some kind of appeal to “the people” and a denunciation of “the elite” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). In academic debates, most scholars argue that populist leadership and populism threaten democratic regimes and values. This belief of scholars raises the question, to what extent is this argument true, and does it have universal applicability?

In the late 20th century, globalisation emerged as a significant political phenomenon. Globalisation has not only contributed to the flow of economic goods but also played a significant role in the transition of ideas from one continent to another continent. This free flow of information and ideas contributed to new socio-political movements and political phenomena. Therefore, with the changing time and contexts, different variants of populism come into the picture, such as right-wing populism and left-wing populism, combining liberalism and socialism ideologies. Today, most countries are experiencing the emergence of populist tendencies and rhetoric in their national politics that reflects in their formulation of policies, political agendas, and programmes. However, the consequences of populism are not the same in each country. It has been proven as a threat to democracy in some countries (Muller, 2016). For others, it has been seen as a participatory force that allows the marginalised section/voters of the society to be included in the mainstream democratic setup. This variation in the outcomes of populist rule in different countries has intensified the debate among academicians concerning the nature of populism and its consequences for democracy. What explains the rise of populism in different parts of the world?

In contemporary times, scholarship on populism can be categorised into two major groups: The minimalist understanding of populism which emphasises the socio-economic conditions or empirical accounts of the rise of populism, and the other one is the maximalist understanding of populism with its main focus on populism itself, its nature and its prominent characteristics. The former understanding of populism tries to define populism by adopting the ideational approach propounded by Mudde and Kaltwasser. They believe society is divided into two binary groups: People vs Elite. The most prominent aspect of this understanding is that it provides a detailed account of the demand and supply of populism. While on the other side, the later understanding of populism rejects this binary idea of populism that believes society is divided into two contesting groups and renders politics capable of producing homogeneous consensus. The most prominent supporter of this understanding is Laclau (2005 who considers “Populism is a process by which community of citizens constructs itself freely and publicly as a collective subject (the people) that resist existing hegemony to take power” (Urbinati, 2019, p.117). In a nutshell, the later understanding of populism understands populism as an emancipatory force that includes the margin communities in the decision-making process.

In recent decades, various researcher and academicians have invoked various factors to formally explain the emergence of populism and success of various populist parties across the globe. Sheri Berman (2021) in her article “The cause of populism in the west” explored demand and supply side factors responsible for the rise of populism. Berman demonstrated that economic hardship (Piketty, 2017; Wolf, 2019; Funke & Trebesch, 2017; Rodrick, 2011; Schafer & Streeck, 2013), and, social-cultural grievances (Berman, 2021; Caldwell, 2009; Murray, 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019,

Kaufman, 2018), are responsible for the rise of populism in different parts of the world. According to Berman (2017), the primary cause of populism's rise is "citizen growing dissatisfaction with mainstream, established political institutions that appear unwilling or unable to respond to their grievances and demands"(Berman,2017).

Historically populism/classical populism, a form of populism that prevailed in the Latin American countries during the 1940-70s, was dominant. But, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the wave of democratisation and various socio-economic reforms swept Latin American countries, it was generally considered that populism had become the idea of the past. The political developments regarding the anti-elite political discourse and state- controlled economic development that overwhelmed the region's political environment during 1940-60s, appeared to be irrelevant to the changing social and economic orders. Nonetheless, at the dawn of the 21st century, the downfall of populism in Latin America took a new shape and emerged in a new form that many thinkers labelled as "New Populism/Neopopulism" (Taggart, 2000; Moffitt, 2016).

According to Paul Taggart (2000), New populism is the contemporary form of populism that arose primarily in Western Europe in the post-war period. Most scholars consider that new populism has arisen from the new social movements prevailing in Europe during the late 1980s. These new social movements raised concerns about student rights, environmental issues, and women's rights and opposed nuclear power and war (Taggart, 2000). These social movements found their political expression in the new politics. These were primarily green parties but also the parties of the new left with a new commitment to liberalism, opposing the stated-led model of development under the post-war consensus. For instance- political parties that were part of the populist tradition, such as "Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico" and the "Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)" of Bolivia, are alive and well. However, their existing policies differ from what these parties advocated in the 1950s. Various thinkers referred to this change in parties' political orientations and ideological stand as new Populism.

Let's closely examine the difference between the classical idea of populism and new populism. We can say that the old idea of populism/classical idea of populism was primarily the outcome of the failure of the liberal institutional arrangements and economic policies that were witnessed at the time of the Great Depression in the 1930-the 40s and the events that followed. The prime enemy of classical populism was "the Oligarchy", a term that refers to the established political elites associated with the landlords/Feudal lords. Classical populism at that time was the multi-class movement that carried the aspiration and demands of the emergent working class for a new place in society and governance. Both politically and economically, its major reference was the state, with its specific form of economic interventions. The major focus of classical populism was the inter-class solidarity and redistribution of economic resources. On the other hand, new populism is generally attached to the collapse of state-led economic policies and an inclination towards liberalism. In the place of state-led development, new populism believes in an open economy, autonomous political institutions and a strong civil society. In current situations, many scholars believe that there are no conceptual differences between classical populism and new populism (Panniza, 2000). On this point, there may be some conceptual similarities between classical populism and new populism, which is quite natural as new populism has evolved from classical populism, but despite this fact,

new populism has its domain of distinctiveness that can be understood from the following table:1,

TABLE 1: Difference between the Classical Populism and New Populism

X factor	Populism (The old Populism/Classic Populism)	New Populism
Emergence	Emerged in the Postwar era of the 1940s in Latin American countries such as Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, etc.	Emerged in the late 1990s and early 21 st century in Latin American, European countries and other continents
Support Base	Industrial Workers and formally organised sectors	Emerging middle and lower middle class, Unorganised classes/sector
Political and Economical outlook	Support state-controlled economy, patronage-based political structure, statist, inward-looking, authoritarianism	Believe in the open market and strong civil society, Neoliberalism, Reform Political party structure/organisation
Major issues	Poverty alleviation programmes, redistributive policies, worker welfare schemes, the establishment of inter-class solidarity, etc.	Nationalism, corruption, environmental issues, climate change, Gender Justice, participation of excluded class into the political mainstream, taxation, ethnic issues and so on
Ideological Outlook	Centre to Left or Right	Pragmatic, No Fix ideological path
Parties Structure	Conventional political Parties are led by established political elites, patronage politics, hierarchical party structure, and command in One-hand	Protest parties mostly emerged from social movements, comparatively loosely organised, and believe in equality in contrast to the hierarchical command structure

Source: This table is based on the author's analytical study of populism.

To sum up, we can argue that new populism has its domain of distinctiveness which established new populism as a new concept to analyse and explain the current political developments across the world. As a new concept, it has some characteristics that help us differentiate between classical and new populism. These characteristics are non-ideology, pragmatism, personalism, and the emergence of protest parties.

Indian Experiences of Populism

In Indian contexts, populism generally refers to the “indiscriminate use of public resources to give goods away to voters” (Chakrabarti & Bandyopadhyay, 2020, p.03). With these connotations of crowd appeasement politics, populism has been understood in negative terms. Due to these freebies practices, it is considered that populist leaders and governments govern the nation in unreasonable and imprudent ways that put at risk the fiscal status of a state in the long run. In this context, it becomes essential to comprehend contemporary populism inside the domain of Indian history to follow its roots and justification for its development. However, to understand and explain India’s experience of populism, this definition is not enough. Here, we need a broader definition that can explain the rise and causes of its emergence. Therefore, populism is a mix of ideologies and political mobilisation strategies that uses the discursive style of rhetoric to construct politics as the moral and ethical struggle between the common people and the corrupt elites. This understanding of populism can be deployed by the movements, parties, and regimes to construct the people vs elite discourse. populist claim to represent the authentic voice of the common people to overcome subordination and thus infuse their projects with an air of righteousness. India is also one of the countries which have a long history of populist regimes and rhetoric in its national politics. Since the 20th century, populism as a political phenomenon has played a significant role in mobilising the masses in mainstream politics. In India, populism as an idea co- existed with several ideological strands, and still, it’s influencing a range of policies of the government.

Populism in India rose out of the widespread discontent against colonial rule. Though India indeed witnessed the second wave of populism in the post- independence era, the roots of populism in India date back to Mahatma Gandhi, one of the most iconic leaders in Indian history. Theories that are used to explain populism can also be applied to his rise. Populist leaders usually have qualities like charisma and appeal, which attract both the elite and the masses towards them. In this context, Weber believed that charismatic leadership is about the specific bond between the leaders and followers (Weber, 1919, cited in Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Most charismatic leaders generated a sense of crisis among the common masses through media and followed the personalised style of politics. Charismatic leaders strategically construct their image as the voice of the people through communication style, language, appearance and clothing. For instance, Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, Jorg Haider of Austria, and Jean Marie Le Pen used rallies to stand among the common masses and address their constituencies directly in language that they would not use in Media (Mazzoleni, 2008, p.56). They also staged controversial events, engaged in verbal extremism and furiously attacked government policies such as immigration, taxes and social welfare. Therefore, through these mobilisation strategies, these charismatic leaders positioned themselves apart from the elite and close to “the people”.

In the pre-independence period, Mahatma Gandhi and Indian National Congress (hereafter INC/Congress) had the status of a populist leader and party, respectively.

Under the banner of the congress, Mahatma Gandhi led India's anti-colonial struggle. At this juncture, Gandhi was the only leader with mass appeal. Gandhi used antimodernist rhetoric, the idea of constructive work, that brought peasants, women, ordinary citizens, and artisans together in the anti-colonial agitations (Subramanian, 2007). In this phase of the Indian national movement, populist discourse, mobilisation strategies, and policies were mostly associated with the idea of nationhood and nationalism.

In the post-independence period, the congress party's populist features were lessened when postcolonial state-building and state-driven industrialisation started during the 1950s and 1960s. However, democracy was consolidated through this period, but political participation was limited to certain dominant groups that had close links with the state. Most of the lower and middle strata of society were outside the purview of active political participation. From the late 1970s-the 80s onwards, the substantive involvement and representation of the lower and middle sections of society started increasing. The most prominent challenger to the Congress party in the 1970s was Jayprakash Narayan, who led the student movement of Bihar against the Indira Gandhi government. After various political forces such as the Samajwadi Party (SP), Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) under the leadership of Kanshiram led the assertive voice of the lower and middle class against the Indian National Congress. These new emergent parties were mainly influential in the state of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar.

In the phase of 1970s, in the southern states of India, parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and its offshoot All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) mobilised popular support of the masses on the issue of language, Tamil cultural identity, and caste. For instance- DMK articulated its support based on opposition to the decision to make Hindi the official language, utilising the Tamil cultural symbols extensively in its mobilisation strategy (Subramanian, 2007). AIADMK, under the leadership of Jayalalithaa, adopted various populist measures such as waiver of all farm loans, free laptop distribution to the classes X and XII, free mobile phones to all ration cardholders, and government reimbursement of education loans, Amma canteen (Livemint, 2016). The success of DMK and AIADMK influenced the formation of similar kinds of political parties, such as the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), which have become significant political forces in the state of Andhra Pradesh and Assam, respectively, since the 1980s. These parties took inspiration from the Dravidian parties and mobilised language groups in their respective states (Subramanian, 2007).

In light of such challenges, the INC populist's features were revived, particularly in the 1970s, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi. After the demise of prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi emerged as a populist leader in national politics. Indira Gandhi, who led the INC replaced many party pioneers- who she asserted had maintained elite dominance and concentrated power in her hands, pledging to use this power to end poverty in India. The majority of scholars considered Indira Gandhi's populist rule as anti-democratic and something that subverted the rule of law (Kenny;2017, Subramanian; 2007, Bandyopadhyay & Chakrabarti, 2019).

According to Subramanian (2007), Indira Gandhi's populist regime weakened the Indian democratic structures, values, and institutions, which finally led to authoritarian rule in India. The methods adopted by Indira Gandhi included intervention in judicial appointments, centralisation of political power in her hands,

suppressing freedom of the press, establishing direct, unmediated links with the voter, bypassing the party organisational structure, developing a personality cult, and various populist mobilisation strategies and policies that directly appeals to the voters such as cancellation of the privy purse, nationalisation of banks, the slogan of Garibi Hatao. Gandhi strategically crafted her image as a pro-people leader fighting against the society's dominant elites. She crafted syndicate leaders of the congress as the enemy of the real people and herself as the sole representative of the common people's issues and as an outsider leader in the national power structures. Kenny, in his book, *Populism and Patronage* (2017), argues that the rise of populism under Indira Gandhi was the outcome of the collapse of the Indian patronage system after Nehru's death. He considers that the Indian party system is based on patronage-based democracy. For him, after the death of Nehru, the subordinate broker at the state level became autonomous from the central leadership, which broke the party cohesion and paved the way for the emergence of a populist leader even in the absence of an economic or demographic crisis.

Most of the Indian regional leaders of the late 1980s and 1990s mobilise political support on the issue of language and caste, such as DMK, AIADMK in the state of Tamil Nadu and Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh which raises the concerns to the socially excluded section of the society into the mainstream national and state politics. In the late 1990s and first decade of the 21st century, various regional political leaders such as Mamata Banerjee, K. Chandrashekar Rao (KCR), and Arvind Kejriwal organised a robust political movement against the established ruling party, for instance; Mamata provided leadership to the farmer agitation in West Bengal and challenged the rule of Communist party, KCR organised Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) movement to get a separate state of Telangana, Kejriwal challenged United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government under the banner of India Against Corruption. Simultaneously, these regional leaders strengthen their position by mobilising political support on the issue of language, governance, farmer issue, and promising freebies. In 2011, India Against Corruption (IAC) organised a social movement demanding a strong Lokpal bill in the country to resist a high level of corruption in the public sector. When the government did not fulfil the demand of the social movement, then a fraction of the movement's leadership, 'Team Anna', decided to turn the social movement into a political party named Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). In the 2013 Delhi election, AAP mobilised political support on the issue of governance, corruption, and development, fulfilling basic amenities to the public at very reasonable rates, such as Water, Electricity. It was the first time in Indian political history that a new political party contested its first election with corruption as its main political agenda. It received a significant start with 28 seats in 70 member constituencies and formed the state government.

The Populist shift in the Indian landscape in the past two decades is particularly noteworthy because leaders in the 1980s mobilised populist support based on caste, language, poverty elimination programmes, and concentrated political power in their hands. On the other side, the leaders of the post-2000s differed in their approach to mobilising support. These new leaders try to build their support based on the issue of governance, people participation, corruption, farmers' issues, development, etc. Therefore, we can observe a change in the mobilisation of support, electoral agendas, and voters' response to these issues.

If we closely analyse the Indian experience of populism, we find that India has developed two streams of populist politics. The first stream of populism was primarily led by the INC from the 1970s onwards and later on by the regional parties such as Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Samajwadi Party (SP), Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), DMK, and AIDMK. During this phase of populist politics, congress and other prominent regional parties mobilised the support of lower and middle strata of the society on the issue of caste, language, and other social cleavages. These regional parties increased the representation of the lower and middle classes and gained them greater patronage and policy benefits. Their primary focus was on redistributive and welfare policies. These regional parties were vocal about the reservation for the backward classes in higher education and government jobs, which was introduced in some states from the 1950s to the 1990s, and then in national government and employment in the early 1990s. Some thinkers like Plagemann and Destradi (2019) consider the present Indian government under prime minister Narendra Modi as a populist government. Indian government under Modi demonstrates both constitutive dimensions of populism, such as anti-elitism and antipluralism. BJP's victory in 2014 came after a series of corruption scandals that diminished the image of INC. During the election campaign of 2014, Modi crafted his image as an ordinary person by referring to himself as Teaseller and his opposition candidate Rahul Gandhi as "Prince/Sahazada". Modi referred to his election campaign as a struggle against the corrupt elite and to putting an end to India's dynastic politics. However, in this phase of populist politics, Modi's campaign was focused on changing the status quo through the politics of development. But at the same time, the idea of Hindutva politics was also part of their strategy to mobilise the support of the common voters.

Let's turn to the second stream of populism that primarily developed after Anna Hazare's social movement on corruption (2011), popularly known as India Against Corruption (IAC) movement. This phase of populism in India is "New Populism" characterised by developmental political agendas, deviation from the social cleavage model of election mobilisation, patronage politics, and pragmatism in their approach. IAC movement ended with the establishment of a new political party called Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) under the leadership of Arvind Kejriwal. Here the critical question is, what constitutes the populism of AAP different from the early populist of the 1980-90s? The answer to this question lies in the AAP's strategy, method, and agendas in Indian politics. AAP emerged as a protest party against the establishment (UPA). As we have seen, from the independence to the first decade of the 21st century, Indian electoral politics has been dominated by social cleavages such as caste, religion, and language and have specific social bases such as certain lower and high caste groups as their loyal voters. But perhaps it was the first moment in Indian electoral history when a party (AAP) emerged from the social movement to contest the national election (2014) on the issues of governance such as corruption, accountability, and transparency in governance by replacing the dominant social cleavages such as caste, religion, etc. However, the party's performance in the 2014 national election was below the expectation. But, "overall the party polled two percent of the total vote at the All-India level, securing the support of more than one crore voters by a party that made a debut in the electoral arena is not a mean achievement" (Suri, 2014). We should remember that the performance of AAP was much better than some of the established parties, such as the communist party of India (0.8%), NCP (1.6%), and JDU (1.1%) votes, respectively. This was not the only election

occasion where AAP contested on the issues of governance, but election after election, such as the Delhi assembly elections of 2013, 2015, and 2020, the national election of 2014, 2019 and the Punjab assembly elections of 2017 and 2022 were contested on the issues of governance, service delivery, and welfare schemes. Party received a huge mandate in the state of Delhi and Punjab and demonstrated that elections could be fought in India without using social cleavages.

Conclusion

If we closely examine and compare India's experience of populism with the Latin American countries, we can argue that there is a lot of variation in the outcome of populist rule in Indian and Latin American countries. In Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia, populist leaders like Peron, Getulio Vargas, and Evo Morales, respectively, threaten the democracy in their countries through various means of suppression such as intervention in constitutional arrangements, ban on unions, restricted liberty to the press, in the same manner, India also faced a threat to democracy under the regime of Indira Gandhi. Except for the regime of Indira Gandhi, it is evident that all of India's populist forces have increased the political participation and representation of historically marginalised sections of the society, such as lower caste and middle-class groups, by providing some of these members representation in national politics. However, their discourse, forms of gathering, and policies varied, with various ramifications for democracy, inclusion, and conflict. From India's experience with populist politics, it is also visible that from its inception, Indian electoral politics have been dominated by the social cleavage modes of mobilisation such as caste, class, religion, and language. But now it is getting challenged by an emergent force like AAP. The populism of the contemporary times (new populism) is changing the attributes of the voters as well as its inherent nature by replacing the social cleavage model with the developmental model, patronage politics with the new age politics where an outsider can also debut in national politics, traditional issues with new-age governance issues such as accountability, transparency. To sum up, we can say that, in contemporary times, with the changing circumstances, populism is also changing its nature and evolving into a new form called "New populism", which is inclusive and progressive at its core and provides space to the historically marginalised groups/citizens into the mainstream politics.

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